Transcript 0:00 [coffee machine buzzing] Today's guest is Adam Schwab, co-founder and CEO of Luxury Escapes, the travel company that sells limited time luxury hotel deals, tours, and cruises to more than nine million members, and also runs Contrarians podcast. 0:14 Mm-hmm. So we'll talk a bit about that as well. Luxury Escapes has got about 650 staff, it's got stores at Chadstone and Bondi Junction, and this year started chartering its own flights from Melbourne to the Maldives. 0:25 Don't tell my wife. [laughs] Uh, Adam was building Luxury Escapes for 17 years, uh, uh, without ri- raising any outside capital, um, during those, those first 17 years, so that's really interesting. 0:37 Welcome to Imperfect Company, the podcast where we tell the real stories about building businesses, mistakes, mess, everything that can go wrong in trying to build a company. 0:44 My name's Leigh Jasper, founder of Aconex, now building Firmble and investing through Glitch Capital. And I'm Sam Krunic, founder of A Cloud Guru, now building Cuttable, and also investing through Glitch. 0:54 Today we're gonna hear how a former M&A lawyer went from subletting apartments to backpackers with about 70 grand, uh, to running Luxury Escapes, why travel was not the first idea that he tried, and what it took to come back as CEO during COVID. 1:09 So, uh, there's so much to get to. Um, wild stories, I think. Yeah. Welcome, Adam. Okay, let's kick off. So maybe right back to the start, the founding story. 1:17 So you've done a few things, built a few businesses, started selling notes as a kid at [laughs] at school, I think. Yeah. [laughs] And then at university. So obviously had a bit of an entrepreneurial streak. 1:26 How did you then start? You know, you went, you went to uni, work- worked as an M&A lawyer. What got you into being a founder? So this is a bit of a thrill for me, being in the room with two unicorn founders. 1:36 It's not often you get to be with one unicorn, but be with two unicorn dudes is a bit of a thrill for me. Like a kid going to the footy and being in the leagues. [laughs] Thank you. Uh... Thanks. 1:44 To answer your question, uh, so my best mate Gez, who was through school and then obviously best mates through uni, he was really, uh, contrarian. He's not on the podcast- Yeah... 1:54 but he's, he was a really contrarian guy. Yeah, right. And we all started businesses. Certainly when, I think you, you probably started your business roughly the same time as we started our first business. Yeah. 2:02 You got... You guys were a bit ahead of us. But being an entrepreneur wasn't cool back then. Yeah. Now, now it is. Mm-hmm. Yeah. You guys have done a lot to help that. 2:08 But back in '04, when you say an entrepreneur, you think Chris Skase, Alan Bond, John Spell. Like [laughs] the guys who went to jail. [laughs] Yeah. [laughs] Yeah. [laughs] So it wasn't... 2:15 Now being a founder is, like, super cool. Back then it was definitely not cool. Back... What was cool was being a doctor- Mm... or being a consultant or being a lawyer- Mm... as I was. 2:22 Uh, but Gez, to his credit, is really good at ignoring noise and doing what he thinks is first principles thinking. Mm-hmm. So he was, 2:29 f- part- partly for sort of lifestyle reasons, partly for tax reasons, he just thought that "We're better off starting our own business." And we had no aspirations to be big. Like, we thought- Mm... if we can... 2:39 So I was earning 50 grand a year as a lawyer back then. Okay. This is 2004 or 2005. And if we can sort of match our... He was at ANZ. If we can match our 50 grand a year, good result. Yeah. Yeah. 2:48 And if we can match our 50 working half as much- Yeah... and paying less tax, even better. Yeah. So- Yeah... we started doing that, and we... The idea we had was a backpacker apartments business. 2:56 And I won't go into the dirty, literally dirty, filthy details of that, but we didn't have much capital. We had maybe 70K between us. Mm. And we literally just fitted out apartments. 3:04 Like, literally went and grabbed a trailer and bought secondhand furniture. Did it yourself? Yeah. Did it ourselves. Uh, and a lot- What, put them in St Kilda or somewhere? Well, that was in... 3:11 actually where we wanted to do it. That's where we got the idea. Yeah. But the very first apartment we got was in the city. Yeah. So we just did it in the city. So talk about- Yeah... our first mini pivot, uh- Yeah... 3:18 was we, we should do it in St Kilda, that's where they all were. Yeah. We ended up doing the city, which was actually a bit of a sort of different, kind of counter-positioned against existing- Yes... 3:26 uh, kind of backpacker apartments, and just went for that. 3:29 It was a, a great apprenticeship, and we did that for, we did that for kind of six or seven years, but then we pivoted to corporate apartments halfway through- Mm. Okay... for various reasons. 3:37 Uh, but it was a great apprenticeship to... As you know, starting a business, supply is almost always the easy part. Mm. Demand is almost always the hard part. Yeah. 3:44 There are a few exceptions, uh, but we had to learn about generating demand. How to- So how do we get customers? Yeah. In that case, guys, was how do we get high-end backpackers to know about our apartments? 3:52 And we needed to get them through... Literally, we were like mini real- like really low-class real estate agents. What, what's a high-end backpacker? 3:57 I think the people who've been to u- like flashback, someone who's been to uni- Yeah... who's here for tur- during uni holiday or- Probably doesn't want to share a room with 15 people. Yeah, doesn't want a dorm. Right. 4:05 It doesn't even, not only that doesn't even- It doesn't want to pay a hotel rate. Y- yeah. Yeah. Hotel rate's impossible. Yeah. So I think what we solved, the problem we solved there was you're a backpacker. 4:12 I tell you, most of our, our tenants were from Europe, so you're coming here for three to 12 months. Yeah. You can't get a rental because, A, you can't furnish it- You just can't afford it... and you can't have a bond. 4:20 Yeah. You can't... It's all forget. So forget rental. Yeah. Dorm is disgusting. Yeah. Hotel too expensive. Yeah. So there, there was this sort of gray market of apartments- Mm... that still exists to this day- Yeah... 4:29 that nobody really knows about because why would you unless you- Yeah... are in that realm. And we were 24 at the time, so it was kind of, we weren't backpackers obviously, but we'd sort of done this- Yeah... 4:38 in other parts of the world. And I'd actually been to Whistler skiing, and so done the same thing, rented an apartment, sub-let, leased it out to other people, so I stayed there for free. And sort of- Yeah... 4:45 it was just an easy business to start, low barriers to entry, and just a really big gr- So we literally put furniture together ourselves and got rid of rubbish. Yeah. 4:54 And if a tenant, if we had lost a lease and had to move, we'd move the tenant's bags for them and got rid of bed bugs, all this kind of stuff that- [laughs] Yeah... it was an unglamorous a job- Yeah... 5:01 as you can imagine, but an amazing apprenticeship into- Yeah... what it takes to start a business. I, when we used to backpack when I was in my 20s, I'd always, I'd never like the dorms. I always wanted... 5:09 If they had a little private room. Private room. That's what... So I've learned that I'm a high-end backpacker. [laughs] Yeah, as a tenant, yeah. I have a... There's a label for this. We're now in San Francisco. 5:17 There's super high-end, uh, subletting because people can't, because of the restrictions on rentals there- Yeah... people keep their lease and just sublet rooms. Yeah. 5:24 So there's a whole gray market on Facebook and, you know- Absolutely... people trying to find- Really? Yeah. Yeah. Instagram probably trying to find, uh, find rentals. Trying to get some. 5:30 So you were basically in travel right from the start in Australia. Yeah, in a way. Yeah. Yeah. Like, we didn't consider ourselves in travel. We considered more, more in accommodation. Yeah. But yeah. 5:37 And ultimately, as we were growing this business, then we mo- moved to living, to living corporate business. Mm-hmm. We started advertising on Airbnb. Yeah. That was a much better model. 5:44 Clearly, that was the platform, and we were the, we were the principal. Yeah. So we would lease a property, and if it was vacant, we'd cop it, which is... You don't want to be that. 5:51 Uh, like it's different if you own the capital and the capital's appreciating. Mm. But we were the worst of every world. So you think of... 5:56 Now you think of competitive advantages, and we know about what a competitive advantage is. We had zero competitive advantage in this business. Yeah. Like, there was literally nothing. Yeah. Yeah. 6:02 So that's why it was a terrible business- Yeah... that the only way we were able to- Sort of operational excellence allowed us to make some money. Mm-hmm. And, yeah, ultimately we- Yep... 6:08 bought and sold half a dozen apartments using a heap of debt, and that's the only money we made really- Yeah... for business. Yeah. Right. So then- Yeah. Yep. 6:16 Well, before we move on, I just really quickly wanna go back, uh, 'cause I, I saw that you, uh, you were at uni and you were burning, selling law notes on burnt CD-ROMs. Is that right? 6:26 [laughs] I really wanna hear this story. It was good research. [laughs] So I'll tell you, either of you guys did law. No. No. No. 6:32 But, um, some of your listeners may have done law, in law there's a cottage industry of notes. So the... All laws open book. Yeah. So you bring in your notes. So having good notes is really important. Yeah. 6:39 And I would... And everybody would buy notes or- Okay... get notes from someone. Yeah. And I was not a brilliant lawyery, but I sure was... I'm, I'm good at making stuff look nice. Yep. Yeah. 6:47 Uh, and I made my law notes look great. The fonts were all p- looked like a, like, looked professional. 6:51 Like, and I wasn't s- smart enough to write the content, but I could get the content with somebody else and make it look nice essentially. Yeah. So I'm like the UX layer on notes. 6:57 [laughs] Um, so I m- I had these notes and a guy... So before this, me and Jez did this with our year 12 cats, which is a thing that used to be the case in Victoria up until the '90s. 7:06 At school I was writing notes actually. So I'd write, we, you can written notes at school and we'd just sell them to guys who hadn't got around to writing their own notes. Yeah. So we, we put them on CD-ROM- Yeah... 7:13 as well, which is the early days of CD. I just photocopied them. Yeah. So I wasn't quite as sophisticated as that. Oh, yeah, yeah. [laughs] So we were, we were high tech. 7:17 [laughs] Um, but, and then so I did the same thing in, in law, and law is, is a cottage industry for notes. Mm-hmm. And I just basically institutionalized it. 7:23 And my coup there was, I went in, there was this book called LegiBook, which is the official law book. So, and, and you know how you get your big law books- Mm... that cost 300 bucks each? Yeah. 7:31 You'd buy from this book, which is in the law building. I somehow, I, at least I don't know how I did it, convinced the people who worked there to sell my notes as if they were like the official Butterworths thing. 7:40 [laughs] Yep, yep, yep. So people go in there, and it was like on the... And I made them put it on like the f- the thing. I was selling for like a, like 100 bucks a pop. 7:45 And all these students think this is, "It's in the LegiBook, so it must be... This is br- a brand." So I, I leveraged off the brand- [laughs]... of this law book seller. And probably for a year, like I... 7:54 10% of the uni students are probably, of law students, are probably using my notes. Yeah, right. Which is pretty funny. Wow. [laughs] Um, I was n- I'm hardly the best lawyer. 8:00 Um, eventually the dean just said, "Nah, no more." Found out. No. It's too, it was just too many people using them, and it was like- Yeah, everyone had the same notes... a little operation. Yeah. 8:06 I then started selling it through this dodgy phone guy [laughs] who I could know his phone seller, and then that got shut down. Uh, and I just gave up eventually. Oh, really? 8:13 Made like 10 grand out of it, 10 grand out of it. So it was pretty good with another guy. So it was his notes. So I said- Yeah... "I gotta pay him a licensing fee," 'cause I was using his notes. Yep. Yeah. 8:21 And obviously my own as well. So he got a percentage, I can't remember how much, and I got a percentage, and- Oh... yeah, it was a fun business. I love it. 8:28 Two months- When we, when I was at, when we were at high school, my brother... This is when graphics calculators had just come out. Yeah, TI83. 8:33 And, and my brother had worked out you could write software for these things. [laughs] And you weren't allowed to take notes into- No... science exams, but he- Frigging... 8:40 wrote this software, custom software, and put all the notes in it. So you could have all the notes- [laughs] In the calculator... on your graphics calculator. Oh, wow. And then he would copy it out to everyone. 8:49 [laughs] But he spent so much time building this program, he didn't actually learn- Yeah... physics and the chemistry, and he didn't get very good grades, but everyone else did. [laughs] Everyone else did. 8:56 [laughs] It kind of shows how unimportant school is and how important... Like, obviously what you, your brother did- Yeah... Ryan did, was thinking outside the box. That's exactly what an entrepreneur needs to do. Yeah. 9:04 So that's 100 times more valuable. If like, if he came to me for a job and he said, "This is what I did," I'd say, I'd give him a job in two seconds. Well- Rather than the guy who got 100. 9:11 He was always about how do you do things, like shortcut- Yeah... to the success. And C- Cloud Guru literally started because w- he went and built a course, h- what's the fastest way to get your AWS cert? 9:21 [laughs] It's like, it's almost the same story. Same. Yeah, yeah. So good. Yeah. Yeah. Awesome. And Jez is a bit like that as well, not to the extent, uh, uh, Ryan was, 'cause he's- Yeah... 9:28 a, a freight, but, um, [laughs] But yeah, Jez is, "How do I... " And he was, he was an 99 TI guy, but he would do like a minim- absolute minimum work, but was super smart. Mm-hmm. Oh, yeah. 9:36 So he, he got this incredible mark just by, like, understanding the system really well. Yeah. Mm-hmm. Yeah. Yeah. Contrarian thinking. Light it up. Yeah. So you've sold the apartments at this point. Yeah. And then you... 9:47 W- what was the next step in terms of getting towards- Yeah, this is 2009... luxury? Yeah. 29. Yeah. Million bucks burning a hole in our pocket. Yeah. Um, funny, one, one, funny apartment sales. 9:56 There was one little funny apartment sales story. When we... So we were renting these apartments. Mm. So one of the apartments we were renting, and we were... This is before we bought it. 10:03 And our tenants, like they were fine, and we would always make sure when we moved out that it was made good. Mm. But the person wanted to sell it, and we were Middle East. So our part... 10:11 'Cause there was like four people living in there. It was, wasn't like styled, like a really nice- Mm... apartment. It was a bit of, not damaged, damaged, but a little bit of sort of- Mm... body to it. 10:20 And he tried to sell it, he couldn't sell it. So we made him this low ball offer, and he accepted. We're the only game in town, 'cause we effectively were the tenant. Yeah. 10:26 Anyway, I think we paid like 400 grand for this apartment, and then we booted the tenants when they were finished their le- when he finished the lease and moved out. Mm. We styled it. Yeah. Dyed the carpet. 10:33 Spent maybe five grand on it, and sold it for like 450. [laughs] Because it just looked nice. So that was the pure arbitrage. Yeah. So you made more money out of that than- We made all our money- Yeah... 10:40 doing that stuff. Um, another one we, again, like it, we, we couldn't sell for 500 grand. We, uh, uh, tenants moved to a different apartment. Yeah. Dyed the carpet, which cost like 2,000 bucks- Yeah... 10:49 but it looked like a new carpet. Painted the walls, put amazing furniture in there. Got like 675. Yeah. Like, it was such, it shows the difference between just making something look good. Presenting it well. Yeah. Yeah. 10:59 Uh, and listening conversion, uh, make something look good. Yeah. Yeah. And if we didn't have stamp duty, they'd probably be a good business just in that arbitrage, right? Possibly. Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. Cool. Yeah. 11:09 So then you've... So what, the next step then, how did you sort of start? Yeah, so- 'Cause Luxury Scapes started, you had multiple products you were selling, if I understand rightly. Yeah. So Luxury Scapes was a bit... 11:17 So we, we had the million bucks burning a hole in our pocket. Yeah. This is 2009, and I was in the UK, happened to meet my, my da- now, now wife during that trip. Yeah. Mm. 11:24 And also saw a business called Top, uh, called Top Table. Yeah. Which has since been bought by OpenTable and now Booking.com owns OpenTable. Yes. Essentially a combination of... 11:32 You may have heard of the Eat Club business? Yes, yeah. Dan runs. Yeah. Uh, it's basically- Great business, yeah... an early school Eat Club. Which is glitches, yeah, well, invest in that through second quarter, so yeah. 11:39 Oh, amazing, which is a great business and obviously AVT guy's been there- Yeah... for a long time, and- Yeah, great business... loved Dan and does a great job. And really world leader- Yeah... in the BCC payment space. 11:47 But what essentially that is, is discounts for empty tables. Mm. So what Top Table was, was a sort of earlier version of that, which was comb- combined online booking, which didn't exist then- Mm... with discounts. Yeah. 11:58 And everyone in UK was, everyone in London was using it. I think Alex Ferguson invested, and I was using it like with my mates. I was there for three weeks, and thought, "This is amazing." Mm. 12:05 Like, "Why doesn't anybody do it in Australia?" And we didn't have a clue about e-com, but- Mm... we thought, "Well, how hard can this be?" We had this million bucks, we'll start this thing. Yeah. 12:13 And a mate who's a unicorn could do design, could do front end, back end- Yeah... design the site for us. Started doing this, and then- A few months later, Jez was in the US and saw this business called Groupon. Mm. 12:23 Fastest business to did a billion dollars in TTV, hit $26 billion valuation briefly. 12:27 Um- I was in San Francisco when Groupon was going crazy, and yeah, it didn't end up working, but it was g- for a while- 300 million bucks now. [laughs] Yeah. [laughs] Smaller than us, but- It worked for a while. 12:35 Worked for... It was, yeah, fastest-growing ever to that point. Fastest. Jez did it through- Oh, right... Jez did a billion with it. Yeah. But, and so it was- Wow... 12:41 they made some mistakes, and Andrew Mason stepped down. But the, um, Eric Lefkofsky, who found- who co-founded it, has done a lot of good stuff- Yeah... since then. Um, 12:49 but we saw that business and thought, "Why don't we do that in Australia? We'll, we'll-" Yeah... "won't do the restaurant thing. We'll do the Groupon thing." Mm. 12:53 We called it ZoopOn, started doing that, and about 80 other people had the same idea. Yeah. 'Cause it was just, again, no barriers to entry. Mm. You could have a start with one deal. Started doing that. 13:01 There's a whole bunch of stuff that we went through [laughs] in that business, but realized pretty quickly... Got... So that bi- We, we got to 20 million bucks revenue- That's fast... so at TTV really quick. Yeah. 13:09 Within probably six months, or maybe a year. Wow. Which is, like, really fast. That is really fast, isn't it? Yeah. We'd been slogging away to get to two mil- Yeah... over like eight years with apartment things. Yeah. 13:16 No. But we realized pretty quickly this was a pretty... Can I swear on the show? Yeah, yeah. Yeah. [laughs] We worked- You can do anything you want, yeah... with a pretty shitty business. Yeah. 13:21 Yeah, a pretty shitty business. Yeah. Uh, so two big problems with the business. One, the unit economics sucked. Yeah. Yeah. So it's cost you 50 bucks to acquire a customer, basket size of 50 bucks, you're making... 13:31 So initially the margins were, like, 40%. Yeah. So you can kinda get away with it. Mm-hmm. Yeah. Margins compressed to, like, 10 'cause there was, again, no barriers to entry. Yeah. Yeah. Just no competitive advantage. 13:38 So at 10% margin, you're making five bucks a sale. And the other- So then businesses started to hate it too, right? 'Cause they'd get- Yeah... they wouldn't get repeat customers on a, on a Groupon style thing. 13:47 It's a short game. Well, that was why the commission was low. Yeah. Because you weren't showing value to the business. Yeah. And the, and the problem... 13:52 We actually were providing great value to the business, but it was a real- Yeah... it was a real perception issue. Oh. So businesses who aren't... Some of the businesses were sophisticated somewhat. Right. 14:00 And what they th- So you basically you do this deal, you get them all these customers. Mm. They wouldn't understand I'm getting a customer free, I wanna turn this into a lifetime customer. Yeah. 14:07 They just saw it as a quick, a quick buck. Yeah, they would. Yeah. They treat the customers badly. Yeah. But then bounces back on us. So we had this- Yeah... 14:13 terrible unit economics and a terrible lifetime, because- Mm... we'd be blamed, 'cause we were the con- contracting party. Yeah. 14:18 You buy a, a restaurant voucher, and they give you a tiny menu, like a compressed menu, and they, they treat you like a second-class citizen. The cu- customer either- Mm... 14:27 demands a refund or, or almost worse, just never comes back. Yeah. So just there's heaps of problems with that business. Yeah. This is why the whole Groupon thing kind of- Yeah. 14:33 That's why actually Eatclub's kind of a slightly different... You, you don't know- Yeah. Yeah. Much better model, so. Uh, and also the VC model, there's no shame in it. Yeah. 14:39 Um, and restaurants have a lot more dynam- dynam- nemesis over when they're offering discounts. Yeah. Mm. 14:44 Uh, so Eatclub was a much better model in every respect, and that's the model we should have done if this VC set existed. But you couldn't... It would've been hard to do Eatclub probably back then. 14:52 Well, the technology didn't exist. Yeah. No one had mobile... No one had sm- well, a few people had smartphones, but they weren't a big component- Weren't great... slightly. 14:57 And also the, the whole payment mechanism they've got where- And no VCCs. Yeah. Uh, so which is virtual credit card- Yeah... which is how Eatclub pays its merchants, so. 15:03 Which you go in and people don't know you're on the discount. Technically- Well, your staff don't know. The, the owner might, but- The funny secret is they actually- Mm... do know, 'cause you get a... 15:10 When you go to Eatclub, this is the funny secret of Eatclub, you actually get a list of name- Adam Schwabe got 25% off, so they actually do know. Oh, wow. But it kind of feels like they don't know. Yeah. Yeah. 15:18 And they kind of don't really mind- Yeah... because it's so dynamic. Mm. But, uh, still amazing business, [laughs] Eatclub. But we, we didn't have that. Yeah. So we realized this was... 15:27 So we were called ZoopOn, and then there was, s- um, Groupon came to the market- Yeah... and Gabby and Hezzy had ScoopOn, so, um- So that's Catch... Groupon was saying ScoopOn, ScoopOn was saying us. 15:36 Everybody was saying each other. Yeah. [laughs] Yeah. [laughs] Uh, so the Catch guys had the Catch business- Yeah... that was going really well. Um- And Catch was a slightly different model to the- Products... 15:43 it's products. Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. And that obviously had that ch- now Catch is no longer, 'cause Wesfarmers did a number on it. But- Yeah... um, Kogan still continues. 15:49 Do you think a lot of that has gone away just 'cause people got bored of it, it wasn't fun anymore? Or is it, um, like Temu coming in and you can just get it direct from China? 15:57 Like I know that's really fashionable with the young kids these days. I think Gabby and Hezzy were always mostly s- fearful of Amazon. Yeah. So I think Amazon- Right... was one big... But Amazon's like off price. Yeah. 16:06 So it was you pay for convenience. It was... I think Kmart's got a lot better. Yeah. So you've got Kmart, which is amazing. Yeah. Yeah. Uh, you've got Amazon, you've got Temu and Shein. 16:13 And Amazon's on wellness, right, but hasn't killed the market. Well, it's killed everyone but Kogan pretty much. Yeah, Kogan still, yeah. Um, and Kmart's in a different, a different- Different... 16:21 um, but Catch was really good at electronics, which is what Kogan's done really well at. Yeah. It was never great at fashion. Yeah. And fashion's really hard. So- Yeah... 16:27 Temu, Shein probably hasn't, wouldn't have impacted Catch as much. It's more Amazon, which- Yeah, 'cause that's more fashion... it's, you get Prime- Yeah... you get a pretty good price, you get it next day. 16:35 Yeah, the convenience. It's- Like if Gabby and Hezzy were still going Catch, it would still be around. Yeah. But it, it was- Yeah. But Catch always had its profitability challenge because it's a really hard business. 16:44 Yeah. Where- whereas Ruslan and David at Kogan have been able to get around that through non-product stuff and through- Mm... being D2C in many ways. Yeah. 16:51 Whereas Catch was always, and as idea my co-owner was- And they run their own brand as well, which helps them. That's, yeah. As idea, my co-owner, Concurrence always says, "You need to own your brand." Mm. 16:58 "Otherwise, it's really hard." Yeah. And the problem with Catch is they didn't own, they don't own any of the stuff they sold. Yeah. No. They're a multi-seller. So- Yeah... we saw all that, and we had... 17:05 So at one point we had the experiences business. Mm. We had some product stuff. Mm. So we had Brands Exclusive and- Mm... The Home, which was Temple Web's competitor. Oh, yeah. Okay. 17:12 And we realized the best part of this was that travel thing. People, hotels were coming to us. Yeah. And we started doing the travel, and travel had a couple of advantages that ex- experiences and products don't have. 17:20 One is massive basket size. Yeah. Yeah. So $2,000 plus basket size, so your unit economics are much better. Yeah. You can spend 400 bucks on an acquisition- On acquiring a customer... and make money. Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. 17:28 And the second thing is hotels are really good at hospitality, especially luxury hotels. Yeah. So you don't, you don't get that issue we had with not being able to control the end-to-end that we had with our experiences. 17:37 So- Yeah... for those two reasons, we realized actually travel, and especially what we're doing is tactical flash sales travel- Yeah... actually makes a lot of sense. We're solving some problems here. Yeah. 17:46 Solving some great problems for customers. Yeah. Giving them massive discounts. Yeah. And for hotels, we're actually saving, solving some amazing problems that we only discovered after- Yeah... which is lucky. 17:54 But we can- And again, it's around inventory for them, just getting c- certain times of the year that it's better. Absolutely. So the big one is incrementality. Yeah. 18:01 So 95% of our customers weren't going to the hotel till we told them about it. Mm. Yeah. So because we were so incremental- Yeah... 18:06 we could Eventually go to a hotel, cap in hand, and say, "We can give you two million bucks of sales. We're not gonna disrupt any of your existing sales." Yeah. "We'll give you new sales." Mm. 18:13 And they go, "Okay, that's pretty good." Yeah. But, and then we say, "Actually, we want a 30% discount and we want a 20% commission." Yeah. They go, "Oh." And we say, "Okay, we'll give you... 18:20 Not only we give you two, three, four, five million bucks," we also say, "We're not gonna sell the bed in the room. We're gonna sell you breakfast, dinner, transfer, massage, all really high margin stuff." Yeah. 18:29 So if you've got a restaurant, if you're, own a hotel- Mm-hmm. Yep... and you've got a restaurant- Yeah... and it's empty, you've paid for your staff, you've paid for capital, you've paid for your food. Yeah. Yeah. 18:35 We'll fill it up at 90% margin. Yeah. And we'll force it, 'cause our customers love that stuff. Yeah. So create that win-win, a much higher margin. 18:41 And it also doesn't look like they're discounts, 'cause you're bu- bundling everything, yeah. Because it's opaque. And the third thing we give- Mm... 18:46 which is almost the best thing for hotels, is we're six month lead time. So- Yeah... the most important thing for a revenue manager at a hotel is, what's my forward book looking like? Yeah. Yeah. So- Yeah... 18:55 if you- they look at their book, book and there's no one, 5% occupancy, they go, "Oh, I've got to drop my prices," and it just smashes profitability. Yeah. Yeah. We can give them 20% base. 19:01 They can lift their prices on every other channel like Booking and Expedia and- Yeah... and, um, travel agents. So whilst our daily rate- Mm... is low, we actually make them a heap of money. Yeah. 19:11 And where that actually is really helpful is we solve on agency costs. So most ho- especially branded hotels, if you're a Marriott, or an Accor, or an IHG- Mm... these are great brands who operate the hotels. 19:21 The owners are a REIT or a family office. Yeah. So if you own one Marriott in Phuket, and you want more business, Marriott goes, "I'm, I feel we're the bad guys, but I can't help you there." Like, we own- Yeah... 19:30 I manage 10,000 properties. What, you have just one. Yeah. Yeah, just one. Yeah. I can reduce your prices, but you know what? That's... They go like. 19:35 We can go to them and say, "I'll give you $5 million of business- Yeah... in two weeks." Yeah. Yeah. They go, "My God." 19:40 And if you're in Bali, and we're, we're like the seventh-biggest country supplying Bali, and we can go... We can make or break a Bali hotel, and give them- Mm... 19:48 $5 million of profitability or you don't do a deal, you'll get zero. So, and, and we don't, it's not a threat. It's like, we want to make you guys money. Are they booking that in a certain window of time? 19:57 And they control the inventory. Yeah. I'm b- I'm full then, out of rooms. I need- Yeah... and, and we'll, because our, the deals are so good- Yeah... people just funnel. 20:03 Like most people, especially our customers, are pretty flexible. Yeah. School holidays are harder, but- Yeah... if you're a 65-year-old with lots of money and lots of time- Yeah... 20:10 and I can get this amazing five-star hotel- Yeah, all that... this week, I can go this week or that, it doesn't matter, matter. It's just a genuinely compelling offer for a customer, right? 20:17 'Cause y- you're leading with the shots of this incredible, beautiful hotel and this luxury location, and you're getting this huge discount. 20:24 I mean, it's, it's very enticing compared to like, I go online and I buy some kind of off-brand product [laughs] at 30% off. 20:32 Like, you know, and, and as you say, you're actually, then they're actually able to deliver on it- Yeah... and give a really good experience. And most of the time, our customers have a great experience. Not 100%- Yeah... 20:38 because it's never 100%. Yeah. Yeah. But 95% or more of our customers- Yeah... have a good experience. And when we, when we don't have, and we'll try and do our best to make sure we- Yeah... compensate. 20:47 So in this business then, what's your... You know, you talked with the others, not having a competitive advantage, not having differentiation. 20:53 What, what is your competitive a- Is it just that you're gonna go, you go and do those deals? Yeah. So I think about this a lot. Yeah. Because we talk about Hamilton Helmer a lot on the OurPod. Yeah. 21:01 And his seven powers, and what you guys- The seven powers of good, yeah. Yeah. And, and such a great way. Now, Dee told me about this, and such a great way to analyze every business- Yes. Yeah... 21:07 that I've put on ourselves. Mm. Yeah. And we actually changed our business a lot sort of three years ago- Based on that, yeah... after reading it. Yeah, right. Yeah. 21:13 So I think what were our powers, if you go back 2000... We were a different... 2019, we were actually quite a different business. Mm. We were just a flash-only business. Yeah. We're now like a mini Booking.com as well. 21:21 Yeah, you are. Almost half our sales are on- Yeah... what we call marketplace. Mm. Mm. So we, we think what our powers are. So we've got a little bit of brand- Mm... but we're not Booking.com. 21:28 So we definitely don't have a real competitive advantage in brand. Yeah. In niches we do. So like, if you're going to Maldives, yes, we're the, by far the strongest Australian out there. Yeah. Mm. 21:34 We're more than half the market, but that's a pretty small niche. Yeah. We're not Booking.com, we're not Expedia. Yeah. We're not Qantas. Mm. We've got, we've got some scale in niches as well. 21:42 So Ba- well, Australia to Bali, Australia to Thailand, Australia to Vietnam, Australia- Yes, yeah. We've got scale, but we don't have Booking.com scale. Mm. We don't have their... 21:50 We don't have 500 people analyzing SEM like they would have. Yeah. So, um, we don't... We have niches of scale and niches of brand, and probably a bit of cornered resource in our, in our deals. Yeah. 22:01 But the one thing that we really needed to build was switching costs. Yeah. And that is something that consumer websites almost don't have at all. Yes. 22:08 I think the best switching cost is your business had an amazing switching cost- Yeah... because you couldn't, couldn't switch right? You couldn't change without going extreme. Yeah. Yeah. So SAP are like the best. Yeah. 22:16 Yeah. We're, we're- It's a project to switch. [laughs] It's, it's almost impossible. Yeah, yeah. We're like towards the bottom of switching costs. [laughs] Yeah. Yeah. 22:21 So think of, you can go to Booking.com with like typing a different word. So it's- Mm. So we thought, how do we build switching costs? Obviously, loyalty is the best way to do it. Mm. How do you build loyalty? 22:29 Who does the best loyalty? So we thought the best loyalty, there's probably two brands. Qantas- Qantas, yeah. Mm... does an unbelievable job with Qua- Yeah... and you try to love them or hate them. 22:37 Almost in spite of themselves, but yeah. [laughs] And their, their loyalty business in fairness is incredible. Yeah, it's good business. 22:41 You can argue about the airline's gotten a lot better now, but, and it was tough over the Joyce era. Mm. But the loyalty business was always a great business- Mm... 22:47 and Liv did an amazing job, and Andrew's doing a good job now. It's, if you think of how good that loyalty is, people pay 30% extra to get a Qantas ticket to go to Dubai versus Emirates on the same plane. Yeah. 22:57 Because like- Yeah, on the same plane. [laughs] Unbelievable switching costs. Yeah. Like it's just a different colored ticket. Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. 23:03 Because you're getting status credits to get, keep your platinum, platinum on or whatever it is. Yeah. So Qantas- Traveling the US, I'm always, I'm mostly Qantas, I'm platinum, so yeah, just- Go on the good lounge. Yeah. 23:11 [laughs] It's hard not to. Even if they've got no internet, like you still take, you still take that. Yeah. So versus like Delta, which has better lounges, better internet, but you take Qantas. Yeah. 23:18 Uh, so we look at Qantas as an amazing switching cost, and you look at who else has built switching costs in the sort of product space. Amazon Prime probably one of the best. Mm. Mm. 23:25 Kogan's done a great job as well, and we spoke to David and Ruslan a lot about- Yeah. Yeah... uh, Kogan first. Uh, and Le Cor plus does a great job with hotels here. Mm. It's got a 400,000 person program. 23:35 They're probably the best in the world at land paid loyalty. Yeah. Mm. So we sort of looked at that and said, "How do we build effectively a sunk cost fallacy?" We want people to pay something. Yeah. 23:43 And I listened to the Acquired episode on Costco. Yeah, Costco's a ma- yeah. Possibly the greatest podcast ever produced, that, that four hours of Costco. Yes. Yeah. 23:50 And we were going to do- Oh, I haven't heard that one... a loyalty- Okay... a loyalty scheme. I listened to that, I go, we're going to do a fair change. 23:55 We have to give a discount off our q- our, our best product, effectively a Kirkland-style thing. So- Yeah... you can now buy 24:02 a flash deals, our best deals, and it's, it's almost free to get Lux Plus, 'cause we've effectively built into the price. Right. So you're getting a discount. Yeah. 24:08 You're paying 250, but if you don't get it, you sort of pay 50 more. Okay. So it kind of becomes- Yeah... not free, but close to free. Yeah. Yeah. It's kind of like Costco. 24:14 After a couple of shops, you're kind of- Exactly... paid for your- Even better than Costco, 'cause you get it almost first shop. First shop. Not always, but almost. Yeah. Yeah. 24:19 Um, and you can, you can also subscribe if you're not buying. Mm. And most people subscribe during the buying process. And- And sorry, for people who don't know, what, what is Lux Plus? 24:27 So Lux Plus is our $250 a year paid loyalty program, which gives you discounts off almo- not everything you buy- Yeah... but almost everything you buy. Yeah. You can save two grand for 250 bucks. Yeah. Okay. 24:35 And we give you amazing flight deals behind a paywall. I see. So you get better deals. Yeah, yeah. So does everybody pretty much book now with Lux Plus? Not everyone, surprisingly. Some people- Mm... 24:43 just don't like subscriptions. Right. So there'll be people who, we see people who can save- A hundred bucks by buying Lux Plus and still won't do it. Yeah. Yeah. So there's some interesting behavior. Yeah, right. 24:52 And these people who say, "So you won't buy it." [laughs] So it's- Yeah. But the, with the, the, the behavior that you would expect that does happen is the sunk cost fallacy. That once people are paying- Mm-hmm... 25:00 50% higher clicks, 50% higher buying, everything 50% higher. Yeah. So we want- Hmm. And funnily enough, we thought churn would be 50%. It churns about 37% now. It's dropping- Okay... 25:09 like a month, which is amazing for us because we've got this very steady annuity- Hmm... that's growing year on year now, which is probably the best part of our business. 25:16 So- How do you measure con- churn on a consumer who books something- It's a year, it's a year... maybe once a year? Right. 25:22 It's a yearly product, so we're looking at how, what percentage of people are resubscribing to Lux Plus. Right, for Lux Plus. So you're looking at that as a single product. Yeah. 25:29 But then how much are they then booking travel? 'Cause we don't all go on holidays every three months, so. Well, significantly more than if you're not a Lux Plus member. 50% more. Right. So you see, we see a ma- Hmm... 25:38 and there's a bit of causation correlation, but even when we- Yeah. Yeah... exclude that- Right... we see a massive uptick in- Yeah... so like- It's like, "Bought the sub, I, I better use it." Yeah. It's sunk cost. Yeah. 25:46 It's pure sunk cost fallacy. Yeah. But it's also amazing value, um, 'cause we're giving you better... If you're saving 200 bucks versus booking.com- Yeah... 25:53 you're, not only are you more likely to buy from us, you're also more likely to buy because there's elasticity in purchasing holidays as well. Hmm. So if I can give you a, an airfare that's $2,000 off- Yeah... 26:01 or on a business class airfare, that makes it significantly better. Yeah. I can't, I can't tell you online because airlines would hate it, but I can give it to you behind a hard paywall. Mm. 26:10 Same with cruise companies never discount, but behind a hard paywall they will sometimes. Ah, right. So we can give amazing deals to our customers that we can't always get legally. 26:18 Oh, so that wouldn't show up on a Skyscanner or a Google Flights. And we can't do it. Yeah. If we did, we'd be booted straight away. Yeah. So we've got to be really careful about making sure we protect our partners. Hmm. 26:25 Yeah. Um, but partners also want revenue, so we want to, how do we find ways to give them revenue which keeps their brand sacrosanct- Yeah... but also is getting a great deal for customers? Yeah. Hmm. Yeah. Yeah. 26:35 It's like a curated subset of n- a niche of a high, high po- hi- potentially high purchasing customers for them. Absolutely. Yeah. 26:42 And then on the back of that, we've also got a points QFF style loyalty where you get status credits- Yeah... and that sort of stuff. So that's got about 2.2 million or whatever now, or 2.3 million now. Jeez, good stuff. 26:50 Which is still a lot less than Qantas. Um- What's Qantas, like 10 million or something more? They're at 16 million now. Wow. There's probably a few, a lot of inactives there. Yeah. So, so you saw this, 27:00 um, opportunity in travel. So how did that become Luxury Escapes? How- So we started [laughs]- And how did you... Well, uh, sort of related to that. Yeah. Can I tell a story? 27:08 'Cause you've s- you essentially swapped equity with Catch in some sense. Yeah. You, you put your product- Oh, right... business into that business, and you took the travel business. So walk us through that deal. 27:16 [laughs] Two questions. I'll go sands first, 'cause it's, yes, I'll take them in order. They're kind of related, right? Yeah. Yeah, yeah, yeah. Yeah. 27:20 Uh, so we realized, we, we, we understood, we didn't know what competitive advantage really was. We understood we had a problem in the early days- Yeah... of, um, deals.com.au, which is what Zoopla became. Yeah. Yeah. 27:28 We knew that there was some real, you know, economic issues and some real competitive advantage issues here. Mm-hmm. Mm-hmm. 27:32 Like, a competitive adva- advantage point is, 'cause commissions are, commissions being smashed is the absolute proof point you've got no competitive advantage. Mm-hmm. 'Cause if you... And, the opposite. 27:41 A business with great competitive advantage, MAAs, et cetera- Mm... is someone who can charge more for the same product. Yep. Yeah. If you've got a brand. Yeah. 27:47 That's why I'm so bearish on LLMs, 'cause I think they've got no competitive advantage, so they're gonna have to reduce prices. Um, but anyway. Yeah, no, I, I agree with that. Uh, but yeah. 27:55 And people will swap overnight. I mean, you can- Yeah, literally. You can get Claude to go and, or- You can get Claude to swap itself for someone else. [laughs] Yeah. 28:00 [laughs] Well, and you, yeah, it'll just go and replace all your artifacts and- Totally... move them around. Which is the bigger problem, which is why I'm so bearish on them. 28:07 But, you know, so we, we, 2011, '12, '13, we're realizing that travel's the best part of our business. Experiences and products aren't. But we had... 28:14 It's really hard, 'cause we knew, we knew we were gonna have diseconomies of scale. So we need to become smaller. Yeah. Like, we, we knew we needed to go travel only. We start- we tried listing in 2016. 28:22 It was ridiculous, 'cause we're way too early. Right. Yeah. Yeah. And the business sucked. Like, travel was great. Everybody said to us, "We love this travel thing, but God, we hate that stuff." Mm. You know? 28:31 And investors are pretty smart. Like, they're not- Yeah. Yeah... you, you sort of, so they think these guys are right. We've got to get rid of- Yeah... this non-travel stuff- Mm... and we've got to be travel only. 28:37 So Luxury Escapes as a brand was 2013. We had- Can I ask something before you go? Pin my... Just to click on that a bit, 'cause as entrepreneurs, we often think it's easy to go, "The investor's wrong." Yeah. 28:46 And to say, "No, just don't get our business." Yeah. But you took that... You couldn't list at that point, and you learnt a lot about your own business. So you didn't take, you took the opposite view. 28:56 "Well, there's gonna be something wrong than what the investor's saying." Yeah, I, I think the first point I usually agree with. Usually I think other people are wrong. Yeah. 'Cause you said it have to with a value. 29:03 Otherwise, you'd never- Yeah, you have to be, yeah. That's right... get out of bed in the afternoon. Otherwise, you'll be like everyone else. Yeah. But we kind of knew it in our hearts that, that- That it wasn't right... 29:07 like we sort of knew it, and they kind of just pushed it to the surface. Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. So and similarly when we became marketplace, Gabby and Hesi were pushing me to do marketplace just a few years later. Yeah. 29:14 Kind of always knew they were right. Yeah. And I kind of just eventually listened. Like, so I think, you know, when we talked last week on our pod, and you said how you, VCs helped you heaps through your journey. Yeah. 29:24 Yeah. Didn't they kind of help bringing stuff to the surface that you really kind of think, but you just needed someone pushing you a bit? Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. 29:30 And sometimes just asking the right question at the right time, where you're like, "Ah, yes, I know. I know the answer to that." [laughs] Especially Chris Banks. Yeah. 29:37 I had a great chairman called Pat O'Sullivan, who'd been chair of Carsales. And he- Mm... he, I would just get one thing from him e- like every time I spoke to him for an hour. Mm-hmm. One thing- Yeah... 29:44 would be just like so valuable. Yeah. Yeah. And 'cause he's done it, and he's so smart. Yeah. Mm. 29:49 And I think there's sometimes you can justify it in your own head, but when you have to sit across from someone and answer a question with something that you, where you know your answer is kind of bullshit- [laughs]... 29:59 and, and you're kidding yourself, it, it brings it to the forefront. You're like, "Okay, I, yep, I know." Yeah. Totally. I think it's something like that, right? Yeah. Yeah. 30:05 So we knew, we knew travel was the good part of the business. Yeah. We knew there was some dise- diseconomies of scale. Mm. And then that led us to in 2017 doing this deal with the Catch of the Day guy. Yeah. 30:14 So we both had three businesses in one. We had a experiences business. Mm-hmm. No, theirs was called Scoop and ours was called- Yeah... Kudo or Deals or whatever. Yeah. We had a travel business. 30:22 They had a travel business. Yeah. Their travel business was pretty bad. Yeah. Ours was good. Mm. They had a great product business. We had a shocking product business. Yeah. So we just swapped. 30:28 We gave them our product business- Yeah... thankfully for nothing. We gave them some equity for their travel business. They absolutely did us over on that deal. [laughs] It was a great deal by Hesi. 30:35 [laughs] Stupid of us. And we merged our experiences business and we ran them. It kind of, oh, well, it's a bit irrelevant. Yeah. Irrelevant. 30:41 Uh, so they became a pure play product business, allowed them to sell to Web Farmers for 233 million. Amazing deal. Yeah. Yeah. Great result for them. 30:47 They got some equity in us, and also bought some equity, equity in us. Yeah. Extra equity in us. Yeah. So amazing deal for Gabby and Hesi. Like, they- Yeah... they did a great deal there. 30:55 We did- Overall, probably a, a best par deal. Yeah. We got a bit ripped off and we're a bit stupid, but it, it made us a much better business. So- Yeah... you kind of cop the direction- Yeah... for the- Yeah... 31:04 we were now travel only. So you didn't have anything in the catch business that was sold? No. You essentially- We had nothing in the catch business. Right. Like, 31:11 we talked about, is there a way to fashion something there? They wouldn't- Yeah. They, they had Tiger in there, so they couldn't really give us- Right. It was hard for them... equity. 31:16 So in hindsight, would it have been better just to shut your product business down? Or did you... Was there some brand like- Probably. Yeah, okay. Yeah. 31:23 Uh, we, we, after we did that, like we could have done a deal with Temple and Webster. Like, so the, the- Yeah. Yeah... it were much less valuable then. Maybe have- Yeah. Yeah... a $3 billion business hopefully. Yeah. 31:31 [laughs] But, uh, it wasn't, like financially, not a great deal, but- Yeah... I think overall the benefit that Gavin Hezzy brought and the marketplace stuff they pushed- Yeah... 31:39 there was some definitely some benefits they gave. Yeah. Yeah. And was obviously a good friend. There were, it was kind of repaying a favor. We had a terrible- Yeah... um, that top table business I talked about earlier. 31:47 Yeah. We'd started a business like that in Australia competing with Menulog- Mm... and EatNow. 31:51 We actually sold our terrible business to Gabby and Hezzy after they started one, and we ended up getting like 20 million bucks from that whole thing. Yeah. 'Cause they sold to Menulog, who sold to Just Eat. Mm. Yeah. 32:00 So it was kind of a bit of pay. [laughs] Like we owed them for that. Yeah. Yeah. Um, so they did a- Yeah, yeah, yeah. Like they helped us out massively there. Yeah. So yes, they probably got the better end of the deal. 32:06 So net, net it probably- We got the better of the, the restaurant one. Yeah. They got the, that one kind of. Also relationships matter. Yeah. And it does- They do... make a difference to our life though. Yeah. 32:13 Ultimately. Yeah. Yeah. Um, and it made us a much better business. So we had this Luxury Scapes business. Mm. Clean skin travel, well, so pure play travel business. Mm. But it was a flash sales model. Mm. 32:23 And that has some is- like some great parts of that business, but some issues like TAMS Limited, it's trust issues 'cause people- Yeah... like don't trust it 'cause it's so discounted. Um- Yeah. Yeah... 32:34 and also like we're only touching, so we, say we got 20, well, 100,000 people to the site. 98, 99,000 people wouldn't buy it 'cause we didn't have what they wanted. So if you want to go to London- Yeah... 32:43 we didn't have anything. You want to go to Byron- Yeah... we didn't have anything. Yeah. If you want to go to Sydney, we may not have had something. So- Yeah... we needed to go marketplace. Yeah. 32:47 Gabby Hezzy pushed us, which marketplace is particularly actually really complicated in travel. Mm. Product marketplaces are easy. Yeah. Travel marketplaces are like crazy hard for two reasons. 32:56 One is- The products are never the same pretty much, so it's hard to get consistency. That's the technical- Yeah... for technical reason. So there's like a trillion SKUs. Yeah. 'Cause every deal- Yeah... 33:04 has like 100,000 SKUs 'cause like the price changes every day. Yeah. There's always different rate types. Yeah. We have like 50 suppliers supplying us every single rate. 33:11 So we, we've had to build all these switches in the background. Yeah. Yeah. So we didn't, we didn't we started building marketplace. This'll be easy. Take us a year. Mm. 33:18 We're still building this thing six years later, and we're still- Yeah. Mm... adding suppliers and coming up, and we're now, our team is like so much better. But like our team back then was like hustlers and generalists. 33:27 Yeah. And our, thankfully our CTO, who was our CTO then ca- went to Amazon, came back, and he's been incredible at building the team. But- Yeah. Our team- Do you think that's easier now with AI? 33:35 'Cause you can r- run data at scale and- Massively. Like we- Yeah... AI actually helpful in that little part of the business is- Yeah... you have what's called matching issues. So- Right... we get supplied by bed banks. 33:44 So we have direct contracts and- Right... bed bank contracts. So bed banks are businesses like Way beds, Hotel Beds. Mm. These random businesses who go and negotiate deals with 100,000 hotels. Mm-hmm. 33:52 They're all competing for this stock, and they're selling to travel agents like us- Mm... 33:55 and Booking.com and Expedia, and there's a heap of tech now in getting as many bed banks as you can and particularly competing against each other. So- Yes... we're just running an auction process basically. Right. Yeah. 34:04 But the bed banks don't want you to run an auction process 'cause it obviously costs them money, so that what they basically do is try and rename all the rooms and cause matching issues. Right. No. 34:12 So we built a bunch of- So you can't compare them, but then AI probably- We built a, built a bunch of AI- Yeah... that now has like three different layers of AI to stop... 34:17 And what, if you stuff up a match, it's bad 'cause you might... 'Cause often what happens is like- Mm... a penthouse matches with a lead room. 34:23 Someone buys a penthouse for a, for a grand, it was like 20 grand, and we have to pay the difference 'cause it's our fault 'cause we matched it wrong. Right. Oh. 34:29 So you don't want to get a matching issue wrong 'cause it's like- Phew... bad. Yeah. Yeah. So we've built a heap, and now we almost zero matching issues. Like we have like one a date max, but- Okay. Yeah... 34:37 not even, 0.1%. But yeah, it's, so there's a heap of stuff that AI's helped with that in that regard has been really good. No, it's business. And it's been, getting content at scale has been great. 34:47 I'm waiting to- Yeah... we can use Cuttable hopefully- Yeah... this week. [laughs] Yeah. Get our marketing scale. It's all AI. 34:52 But, um, yeah, it's been, it's been a great j- Our tech team now is like, I think one of the better tech teams in Australia. Not, we don't, we've only got 170 in the team. Mm. 35:01 It's not as big as Atlassian and Canva, but if you look at what they've been able to build- Mm. Mm... uh, it's been, in travel, like up there with world best, up there with Booking.com- Yeah. Yeah... 35:11 with a much small team. Yeah. Amazing. And so how do you, when it's in marketplace, again, how do you differentiate? 35:19 Um, 'cause I assume like as a consumer I could go to Booking.com or I can go to Expedia or- Super hard... yeah. Yeah. [laughs] Yeah. So the, the loyalty helps, so we can offer better prices for loyalty members. Yeah. 35:28 Especially behind the paywalls. Yeah. That's one way. Uh, and ultimately, the only other way is through brand. Yeah. So- Yeah. Like you think of all the powers, none of the other powers work. Yeah. Yeah. 35:36 So we have 24/7 customer service. Booking, impossible to speak to anyone. Yeah. They, they don't care. They go so- Yeah, yeah, yeah. Oh, you never would. Yeah. 35:42 But you can al- and now if actually AI's done a heap of work around CSS- Yeah. Yeah... you guys know. Yeah. But so now half our stuff, half our, our queries are solved by AI in a much quicker, better way. Yeah. Yes. 35:52 If you want to get a refund, you don't want to speak to someone, you just want to click, click, click Refund. Yeah. Yeah. So if you want to add a transfer or change a transfer, you don't want to speak to someone. Yeah. 35:59 So this is like the end of- Yeah. Yeah... if, if you've had a bad experience, you want to speak to someone. Yeah. 36:02 But so we haven't changed our customer service team size in the last two years, but we've doubled our transaction numbers. Yeah. Wow. Yeah. 36:08 To be honest, just having good customer service in travel, if your price is the same, that, that's a huge... Even if the price is the same, I mean, like that's a huge competitive advantage. Yeah. 36:16 'Cause all these online sites, they're just, you know, it feels like a gamble. You're giving your money and then you just hope something doesn't go wrong. Well, you need something. 36:24 'Cause you're never going to be able to speak to anyone. [laughs] Exactly. Very similar. 36:27 Getting a hire car down in, I think we were in, um, it was Perth or somewhere, but because I booked through, didn't realize this, but I booked through a third party- Yeah... 36:34 couldn't, the hire car company wouldn't deal with it. No. The third party wouldn't deal with it. Yeah. I had to go back to the... 36:39 It was just a complete mess, and it was just a simple thing where you just go, "Okay, I didn't realize I actually booked through a third party when I booked it." Yeah, exactly. Um, so- And we have that. 36:47 We still sometimes- Yeah... have those issues 'cause like if you're booking through a bed bank, we're not the counterparty to the hotel. Mm. 36:52 Um, so if you booked through- But you'll still front that in terms of helping the customer. We'll absolutely help, um, to, like to a point where sometimes you can't help. Yeah. Mm. 36:58 Like what's really frustrating, someone buys a non-refundable deal, and they have a really good reason for a refund. The hotel says, "Fine." And then we'll go to ex- whoever's supplier, Expedia booking- Yeah... 37:07 CT or whatever, uh, hotel beds, and say, "Give this guy, person a refund." They just, they don't care. It's not their customer. If anything, they'll- Yeah... they'll actually incentivize not to help- Yeah... 37:15 'cause they want the customer themselves at their front end. So we'll often get into a fight with that middle, [laughs] middle- Right... person supplier on behalf of our customer. 37:21 Sometimes it's just impossible, and like- Yeah... we just can't get it. But if you have a direct... 37:24 If you buy a Maldives package through us, and you buy a flight, so, say you buy a flight, even if it's directly through an airline- Mm... and you got... Let's say you spell your name wrong and you put- Oh... 37:33 two As in Jasper. Yeah. Like, good luck. Like [laughs]- Yeah... it's almost impossible. Yeah. If you buy business software, that's fine. But if like, like it's almost impossible- Yeah... 37:38 they might charge you for a new ticket. If you... We'll just f- fix that in two seconds. If you- Yes. Yeah... if you have an issue with a hotel, we almost always, for the two... 37:44 Ones we work with directly, we know the hotel. We'll go and bat, and they'll usually help us 'cause we give them a lot of business. Yeah. 37:49 So if it's a direct deal, we can be, like, super helpful, even to the point where it's like we can get people availability in blackouts, we can move their dates to a period that's not allowed, we can get someone- Mm... 37:58 a refund when it's not allowed. Like, we can do a lot of stuff. Not always. Yeah. But we can more than like a booking. Booking won't even try, whereas we'll go out of our way to try. 38:05 But sometimes we just can't help it if we don't have full control over the end to end. Yeah. We just do our best. Yeah. [clears throat] Um, so building the business, you got to... 38:13 You've done the deal, catch at that point. Um, you're building, things are going well. Probably a couple years after that, COVID hits, so couldn't be worse for a travel business. [laughs] So I'd love to hear- Yeah... 38:23 how you navigated that. Um, I mean, COVID was bad for a lot of bus- I mean, some tech businesses it was amazing because everybody's sitting at home. Yeah. Helped me. Yeah. [laughs] Everybody's learning at home. 38:33 Everybody's learning at home. Um, but yeah, talk us through that. Look, couldn't be a worse environment. Um, government's not helping, state or federal. Um, 38:42 it's a government- The federal did help, um, with the JobKeeper stuff. JobKeeper, yeah. Um, we're trying to- Yeah... put the old man on the horse. Yeah. And it was... That was COVID for us. 38:48 So you think as COVID happens, terrible. Like, we, we had to refund a heap of people, and of course couldn't sell anything. Yeah. It became a massive blessing because we were private still- Mm... and we had cash. Mm. 38:59 And we ran it, ran, always ran the business pretty conservatively. I actually had semi-retired for like a few months before. Yeah. So you weren't CEO at that point. No, I was kind of coming in every day. 39:07 It's like the worst situation for the guy who replaces me. For the new guy. Yeah, yeah, yeah. Poor guy who replaces me. Yeah. But, so he, so he, he'd been doing it for like six or seven months- Okay... 39:14 running the business. Um, and I was having a great time. Yeah. Mm. You know, traveling and whatever. Uh, and then COVID happened, and it became pretty hard the first couple of months. 39:23 But within a couple of months, right, everybody thought it would end pr- a lot sooner. Yeah. But, like, the markets had changed in that we could still sell Australia to Australia. 39:33 It, like, there were, yeah, border shutdowns, we could still sell. And we could still sell America to Maldives. So we still had some pockets of, um, good parts of the business. 39:40 And because we sold packages, not commoditized products like booking on Qantas- Mm. Mm-hmm... our customers didn't demand refunds en masse. 39:46 We had some people who did, but most people were- They were happy to just kick it forward... just keep, kick it forward. That's right. Yeah. Yeah. Um, so it became... 39:51 We, so we didn't, we, we actually, we actually did end up raising cash, not, not growth capital. We raised some balance sheet- Yeah... repeat air capital and some secondary. Yeah. 39:57 Um, at, after COVID through the Pier 12 guys- Yeah... who've been unbelievably good shareholders. Mm. Amazing. Um, and we were able to get through COVID. 40:06 And w- like, I was pretty outspoken on COVID and lockdowns and all that kind of stuff. Mm. Uh, but also, I was constantly trying to take a position on when is this gonna end- Yeah... and how aggressive can we be. Yeah. 40:15 And you could see vaccination rates, and- Mm... there was a bit of a gap. I, I actually opened a little... Dominic Pearce Hotel in New South Wales opened a bit earlier- Mm... than I thought. But- Mm... 40:22 we had it pretty close. So we, we, we didn't sack a single person because of COVID, versus every other... The bookings, great. Yeah. The great travel businesses fired people, Airbnb- Yeah... Flight Centre. 40:32 We were super lucky. We were, 'cause we were private and we had cash, we were- Yeah... able to keep our staff. Okay. And we actually grew our team over COVID. 40:37 But your revenue must have gone through the floor for a, a year or so. We lost 50 million bucks- Yeah... over the COVID period. Yeah, yeah. 40:42 But we didn't have to pay hotels till people started traveling, which is why we raised capital- Ah... to cover that funding gap. Right. Yeah, okay. So we- But you're still paying staff though? 40:50 Yeah, and but JobKeeper helped. But yeah- JobKeeper... we were absolutely paying staff. Um, but we were, we were really lucky to be private. Did people take a, a pay cut or what? 40:56 Um, people had b- like, people would work three days a week for the first couple of months. Right. But after that- So you pulled back a bit... after the first June, so June 2020, we had a great June, and that was normal. 41:05 Right. Um, and- So June 2020, it bounced back already by- We had an amazing month in June, because that was when the bor- What, what-... Australian borders opened. Oh, right. 41:12 It was the first sort of lull, and then Victoria had that debacle in July. Uh- Yeah... but June was amaz- okay, and we weren't spending anything on marketing. 41:19 But they hadn't opened, had they not opened international borders? No, no, international opened 20- 22. So it was just domestic travel at this point? Domestic. Yeah. And also some international from international. 41:25 So we had a U- we'd got a US business and a UK business. Oh, okay. I always, I always find people who don't live in Victoria have a different perspective on COVID. [laughs] Yeah. 41:32 Like, I see Victoria, uh, I see COVID as two years of not being able to do anything. [laughs] Yeah. Whereas like New South Wales, Tasmania, it's more like, "Oh, it was about a few months." 41:40 [laughs] W- WA, WA was unbelievable. Like, we, we- Yeah... we did the WA deal in Perth, and we were going nuts 'cause you could- Yeah... go and do whatever. Go anywhere. So we were, we were- Yeah, yeah... 41:47 to that old man and the horse, we were actually super unlucky then super lucky- Yeah... because we were in the position we could capitalize on this bad luck to everybody else. So poor Flight Centre who... 41:55 And I was really close to Screw, especially at that time. Yeah. They had to, like, shut 400 stores. Like, it, that- Yeah... we had no stores then. Yeah. So it was, we were, like, unluckily lucky. Yes. Yeah. 42:05 Uh, so- Yeah... we were up tr- we went from 200 staff to 600 staff within a year of COVID. Whoa. We went- Wow... tech team of 30 to a tech team of 150. Like, we were able to transform the business marketplace. Wow. 42:16 So yeah, it was a, it was a curse, but it became a blessing. Is that because when the world came back online post-COVID, everyone wanted to travel? Was there a big boom? There was... Yeah, there was a bit of a boom. 42:27 Uh, but we were also, we got a heap of market share- Yeah, okay... over that period. But you said- Um- Yeah, I see, I see. It was both. Yeah. You says unlucky, lucky, but you've also made the luck. What were the things? 42:35 So you kept the team. What were a few other things that got you... You obviously raised some capital. Yeah. So- We raised capital basically when COVID was over. Yeah. So we got a post-COVID val. Yeah. 42:43 So like, if you look at all the other publicly listed guys, or Airbnb were public at the time, they had to take shocking terms, condo notes on massively dilutive terms. Yeah. So when... 42:51 And- So you had to ride through then raises coming out of it? Yeah. Yeah. And most of that raise was secondary, ironically, not even primary. Yeah. We just put enough to keep the, keep the balance sheet okay. Mm-hmm. 43:00 Yeah. Um, so yeah, we, we got lucky there. Lucky to find the Pier 12 guys who were super supportive and c- Yeah... and Campbell. It was sort of late '21, so COVID was still a thing, but it wasn't... really a thing. Yeah. 43:09 So it was- Yeah. And Campbell was smart enough to see through that and give us a fair valuation, and he's got some, got some great investors, um- Mm... via them. But it was... 43:17 'Cause we'd, yes, we'd been, we effectively, we, and we are living bootstrap the whole time, 'cause we never raised- Yeah... a lot of capital. Yeah. 43:22 Uh, we only raised that one cap- bit of capital for, for balance sheet rectification, really. Yeah. So bar the COVID, we never would've raised. Yeah. Yeah. 43:29 Um, and even when we're looking at IPO-ing, it was all, like, we were, we didn't have any... Part of the challenge with IPO-ing, other than the fact that we had a shitty business, was- Yeah... 43:35 we had no need for the capital. Yeah. Yeah. [laughs] So- Yeah, yeah... it was a hard question to answer when they say, "Where do you want the money in?" 43:39 We had to sort of make up acquisitions, which sounds bad, or you say- Yeah... the war chest sounds bad, so there's no real... Secondary sounds bad, so there's no- So going from having no, uh, 43:49 capital partners to after the raise, does it change how you run the business at all? Or, like, have you noticed a difference or no? No. In fact, it's a, it... 43:58 Like, Campbell was, he was really supportive when maybe some other shareholders weren't. Yeah, okay. So he- Yeah... there was, there probably a... So after COVID, so I've set up this great story, how good it was. Yeah. 44:06 But there was probably, we actually over-invested post-COVID, so we went- Okay... to 600 staff, and probably got a bit cocky. Yeah. Yeah. 44:12 And then it came back, but it didn't come back quite as quickly as we thought it would, and then we didn't realize that marketplace thing I was telling you about. Mm-hmm. 44:19 We didn't realize how complex and how long it would take. Yeah. So our margin wasn't quite there. Yeah. And we hadn't built all that- Yeah... teaching tech I was talking about. Yeah. 44:24 So because of that, we, we just got a bit, bit ahead of ourselves. Yeah. And we, we were predicting these great profits, and this weren't coming. Yeah. And some of our shareholders are getting pretty angry. Yeah. 44:34 Uh, understandably. Yeah. But Campbell, and I, I, I could sort of see the path through. Mm-hmm. And you see when you're in there, you can sort of see. I knew we had to build some stuff- Mm-hmm... 44:41 to get to the profitability we needed. And some shareholders were saying, "You need to sack 200 people. We're too cost-heavy." Mm. Uh, and Campbell... And I, I explained, "No, we can't... 44:51 If we sack people, we can't do what we need to do, and we can't get to the profitability we need." Yeah. And Campbell saw that. Yeah. And his backing, and my chairman, Andrew McElwain, was great as well. 44:58 So those two guys were really, and Idro as well, another director, were really great at backing us through that period. Mm. Mm. It was probably a year where it was tough. Like, we weren't going broke. Yeah. 45:09 We just weren't making the money that we'd sort of said we would. Yeah. Campbell could have said, "You need to sack people. What..." Yeah. "We're, I've invested this valuation. You're doing shit." Yeah, yeah. 45:17 He was really supportive, and without that, like, it would've been a much harder argument up around boardroom table. Yeah. Uh, well, I don't have, you know, dual voting shares. Like, I, I can do what I want. 45:26 I've got a board- Yeah Yeah... who answer to. Yeah. I'm only owning 20% of the business. 20- Mm-hmm... and my co-founder's 20, so we're 40, but we don't control. Yeah. Can't control. Yeah. Yeah. 45:33 So without Campbell support, we'd be a different business now. That's why I think when you raise money, you've got to... What I say to other founders, you've got to, don't look at them as investors. 45:41 Look at them as business partners. They're gonna be your business partner. Uh, could you have, can you run a business with this person? I think- Totally... the relationship's so important. And the person as well. 45:49 And we've had other shareholders over the journey who we raised capital from, but the various reasons why they came in- Yeah. Mm... who weren't supportive- Yeah... in a way. Yeah. So, 45:57 um, it's, yeah, it's, it, so choosing a shareholder. And like you, you guys get it a lot more, given you're, you're in the business, but people often come to me about asking about raising capital. Mm. Mm-hmm. 46:07 And my view is, unless you have a, a really good partner- Yeah... and a really good VC, like VC, like you guys, like, y- you pick a bad partner or bad investor, and the tax on your business is astronomical. 46:18 'Cause every time you want to do something, you're paying this tax to this person. Oh. Yeah. 'Cause your shareholders agreement will give them a huge amount of power. Yeah. Yeah, and you can never undo it. Yeah. Yeah. 46:25 It's a one-way door. [laughs] Yeah, totally. It's a one-way door. It's the worst one-way door. Yeah. 46:29 [laughs] And that's why I say, obviously, I'm on your pod, but you want to be with you gu- like, you guys run businesses. Yeah. Mm. Like, you've made all your money. You don't need to make... 46:37 Like, you do it 'cause you want to help. Yeah. Uh, so- Yeah, yeah... like, picking a, and obviously Peter Thiel has done it in the States. Yeah. 46:43 But picking a, a, a, versus a Sequoia model, who will just, like, hurt you at the first opportunity. Yeah. Like, picking the right VC is so critical. Interesting, even the big names, like you mentioned Sequoia. Yeah. 46:50 The big names, they, they see you as one of many bets, to put it one way. [laughs] Yeah. If you're not in the top few. 46:58 Yeah, I know plenty of founders who had the big name American VCs, and they're like, "I can't get any time from them." Yeah. You know? Just like, yeah, exactly that. Yeah. 47:06 They're doing these, like, multi, multi-billion dollar funds. Yeah. And they're just... Yeah. And if you're not at the top of the list- If you're not the top one percent... you're not. 47:12 Same with, same with investment banks. 47:14 You choose an investment bank, and you say you want to do a, you got a bulge bracket, and you're only raising 50 million bucks, you'll get shocking service because they're working with billion dollar companies who are much- Yeah... 47:21 more important than you. Yeah. Pick a lawyer who's a... I used to work at Freehills, which is a big law firm. Yeah. 47:25 But you pick a, a Freehills or a Mallesons, and you're a small business, you'll get, you'll pay a lot for bad service. You, we work- Yeah... with a, a really good mid-tier firm, and we're- Yeah... a pretty small pond. 47:34 So I think it's- Yeah... all the way along. Yeah You've just got to choose the right partner for you and hopefully- Yeah, you've got to be, yeah, you've got to be important to them. [laughs] Right. 47:40 People think, "I want this brand," because- Yeah... we know that brand has power. Mm. Like- Yeah... these VCs, the Sequoias, the whatevers, um, the Kleiners, they built this incredible brand. Yeah. 47:49 And yes, they've, they had the Googles and the Me- the Facebooks and all this stuff, but they've also had a bunch of businesses that didn't work- Yeah... that you don't hear about. Mm-hmm. Yeah. Yeah. A lot of, a lot. 47:57 [laughs] Yeah. Yeah, we don't talk, we don't talk about the graveyard of all the- [laughs]... many ex-Sequoia companies that didn't make it. [laughs] But, uh, yeah. 48:06 And there's- And it's not, and we're not just picking on Sequoia, obviously. There's, you know, it's just the big, big US investors are often that way. Yeah. So 48:12 running Luxury Escapes, it, it feels like you've got kind of two-sided go-to-market here. So you've got to build out more, in the software world, we'd call it product-led growth, like online, e-commerce- Yeah... 48:25 mass-market sales, and at the same time, you basically, is it fair to say you've got to have a, like a, uh, a more in-person bespoke sales team to go and win the deals on the supply side? It's a really smart observation. 48:37 So we talk, I seem to have talked about it before, most businesses, the demand side's hard and the supply side's easy. Yeah. The one exception is our business. Yeah. 48:43 And so the other exception is like a, a transactional business, like a, a law firm where you've got to get your, your next, um, client. Yeah. But we've got to fight for our demand and our supply- Yeah... 48:53 which just makes it a really hard... It also makes it a bit more defensible because- Yes... you can't su- suddenly operate, open up a Luxury Escapes tomorrow, 'cause hotels will just laugh at you. 49:00 So- Yeah, you go to a hotel, "I'll give you $2 million of business. I don't have any customers." Yeah. [laughs] Yeah. So you, you got the cold start problem. Yeah. Yeah. 49:06 And that's an active sales team on the supply side, right? Yeah. So when we talk about our sales team, I actually think about our hotel- Relationship team- Mm. Yeah... not our 200-person phone team. Mm. 49:15 'Cause they're both sales teams. Right, yeah. They're just one's dealing with customers, the other one's- Yeah. Do they, do they, do they sit together? No. 'Cause they're different phones. Totally different. Yeah. 49:21 Um, our hotel team is both Melbourne, all spread, spread globally- Yeah... 'cause you want to be as much on site as you can. Yeah. Our, our phone team is in the Melbourne office as well mostly. Yeah. 49:30 We have some people around. So we've got a Barcelona team- Yeah... we've got a London team, 'cause we try and speak to... We've got customers in Europe and customers in the US. 49:36 But we- our, our, um, contact center, which is both service and sales- Mm... is on level two, we're at level four, so- Yeah... there's obv- obviously a lot of crossover. Mm. 49:44 Um, but they don't, the hotel guys and the phone guys, in the early days we did, 'cause we were one little office with 30 people. Yeah. But w- just 'cause the team's got a lot bigger- Yeah... we kept them together. Yeah. 49:54 Yeah. Yeah, okay. And yeah, so stupid question, how [laughs]... I always wondered this with marketplace businesses, how did you get the flywheel turning? Where did you start? 50:05 You start at, you have to have some supply to sell. It's the opposite of a stupid question. [laughs] [laughs] So how we s- we solved our original cold start problem was in the experiences business. 50:13 By the time we had the travel business, we, we'd solved the cold start problems. How, how do we solve the cold start experiences problem is a really good question. Yeah. 50:18 So I remember going, so this, this is 2010, January 2010. We're starting this Groupon business, and we're going, "So we need to get one deal a day." Yeah. Yeah. That's why we came. Yeah. 50:27 And we'd rock up to a restaurant and say, "We'll put you, we'll, we'll get you lots of customers." They go, "Okay." Mm. And so then, "How?" I said, "We'll put you on our website, and we'll do a deal. 50:35 You'll give a great deal, and you'll get customers to come." They say, "What's your website?" "Doesn't exist." "What are your customers?" "They don't exist." Mm. Mm. So there's your cold start. Yeah. Yeah. 50:42 So how did we solve that? So Jez actually solved it, uh, well, Jez thought of it. 50:45 So this is back when Facebook was pre-Facebook bait-and-switch, when you could create a group, and you could advertise that group organically. So- Right. Yeah... 50:53 TikTok and LinkedIn, you still can have organic reach, but Meta, forget about it. Okay. They obviously monetize- Yeah, everything... everything. Yep. Back then they hadn't monetized. 50:59 So there was this group called Secret Melbourne. This random guy started it, had about 50,000 people on it. Mm. And Jez goes, "Why don't we buy this group?" I said, "What are you talking about?" 51:08 He goes, "You can- why don't we just buy the group and then we can advertise on this to 50,000 people?" Mm. I said, "Oh, that's not a bad idea." Mm. And I looked at the Facebook terms, and you couldn't buy a group. 51:16 But it didn't say you couldn't buy the password. So I got my uncle, who's a lawyer, to write this random contract. Went to this guy, said, "I'll give you 20 grand for the password." He goes, "Sure." 51:23 Changed the password, we owned the group. [laughs] [laughs] And that was our first, so we now went to, went back to that restaurant- Oh, wow... Japanese restaurant, still exists on Flinders Street. 51:29 And you've got 50,000 people. We've got 50,000 people on our, on our, in our group. Mm. And he goes, "Okay." So how we started, literally day one, 51:36 you, you call it sock puppeting, so created all these Facebook accounts, and said, "Look at this great deal. Look at this amazing deal." Out my 16 sock puppet accounts. Eventually you get the algorithm kicking in. Mm. 51:45 Yeah. Like, like you talk about with Cuttable, and people go, "Actually, this is a good deal." Yeah. And that's, that's how we got it. 51:50 And then eventually, a couple months later, we didn't have to sock puppet anymore 'cause we had- And you already had the deal from the experiences business. Yeah, you had to get deal first. Yeah. 51:56 Uh, and so by the time we w- we started Launching Travel- Yeah... we had customers. Yeah. So we had the customer side sorted. 52:00 So then you have, yeah, so it's one bouncing- You gotta have, like as we saw with the seat guys, or the real estate guys, or the car guys, you've gotta have one side of the marketplace first. Mm. Yeah. 52:08 Uh, and then once you have one, you can get the other, but you, you kind of need something, and our- Yeah... something was we need, we need supply first. Yep. Yes. 52:16 And today you still, I see you're advertising, so you're clearly still bringing in more customers- Yeah... via advertising. So that drives one side of it. 52:23 Um, the other side you're doing outbound essentially to, and you have all your hotel networks. Um, 52:29 is the, how do you keep b- is it still advertising, or does it, uh, is most, you know, how much of it's sort of internal, word of mouth, you know, people speaking to other people versus advertising to bring? 52:39 I actually don't know the split. We still spend, we spend like 70 million bucks a year on marketing. So still a lot, yeah. So a decent spend. Uh, mostly SEM, but- Which still bra- builds a brand too. 52:46 It's not just bringing in- We do a lot of direct response, but it's branded direct response. Yeah. We kind of get a free carry with brand. Mm. 52:51 Um, we do, we do, and we have, and we also do a mini sort of, and now everyone does it, chemist warehouse, supermarket model, where we have a media business. Right. So we've had a TV show for nine years. 52:59 We've got a magazine. We do an expo which has, had 13,000 people come through last year, which we're doing two cities. Oh, okay. We've got three retail stores now, which act as big sort of, um, edifices to the brand. 53:09 They've got, in Chadstone, massive TV screens out the front. Mm. So it's like- If you've got re- you've got physical retail now. We've got, we've got I think the number one travel store in the world. Mm. 53:18 Does close to 100 million bucks in sales in one store. Chadstone. Chadstone. Um- That's, and you have Bondi as well? 53:22 We've got Bondi, and we just opened Chadstone in Brisbane last week, and had 5,000 people- So these are big high traffic shopping centers. Um- You know, uh- These high-end shopping centers as well. Yeah. 53:30 And we, like, if you look at where we are in Bondi and Chadstone, we're next to Apple. Yeah. You know, so great spots. Mm. Uh, Chad, we're in a pretty good spot. Now it's DJ's ironically, but, um- [laughs] 53:39 But, but Chad is Chad. It's such an elite center that- Yeah... you can sort of be not anywhere, but it's generally good. But yeah- We-... we look at that as a marketing/sales channel. 53:47 So that feels like, I remember walking through Chadstone and seeing that, and it just, it seems like such a contrarian that I didn't know you had a physical store. I'm like, "Oh, it's so interesting." 53:56 It's like when Amazon started opening bookstores. [laughs] Yeah. [laughs] If you look at Apple- Apple, yeah... one of the, the greatest retail, greatest value unlocks ever has been Apple retail stores. Yes. 54:05 I love Prof J and he talks about this all the time, like how much value Apple created through their stores. Yeah, yeah. Like I'd love to say it was my idea. I just copied Apple. Yeah. Or you copy Apple. Yeah. Mm. 54:13 And even, even look at our stores, they look like kind of Apple st- We don't- Yeah... spend 12 million bucks on them, but they look like Apple stores intentionally. Yeah, they do. Yeah, yeah. Yeah. 54:18 They've got the iPads out the front. They've got the, the green inside. They've got the wood. Like it's, it's very intentionally Apple fixated. Yeah. And we give you champagne. 54:25 You have the, when you, when you buy something, you have- Oh... warm cookies when you get there. We want to create an amazing experience that- Mm... we're gonna be d- how do we counter position from Flighty's? 54:34 So is that- It's a great business, but you know. Yeah. So is that a br- so is the purpose of that to build brand awareness or, like, or brand connection physically? 54:42 Or is it, "Hey, we just think we can make more sales by doing this?" Ev- yes and yes. Both. Yeah. [laughs] I went, I went to the board like three years ago and said, "I want to do stores." And everybody said [laughs] 54:51 Yeah..."You're stuffed." Don't be a Flight Center, yeah. Like, "It's a ridiculous idea. It's gonna waste money. It's CapEx. We're not a retailer." And I just sort of did it anyway. Yeah. And I said, "You know what? 54:59 I'm gonna cop the heat if it was wrong." Yeah. Yeah. Uh, and the reason I, we did it was 55:05 we thought the brand carry would, would pay off the costs, and if we can break even off those stores or come close to breaking even, the marketing benefit we get- Yeah... from you walking past and- Yeah... 55:13 thinking about it next time, will be significant. And then as it turns out, I made great money. So that was kind of- If you're doing 100 million bucks, you'll be making some money on that, so. 55:20 It's a low margin business, if he hits. Yeah. But, um, yeah, so it's... And even, like, Bondoi's going really well. Yeah. And there was another open last week, but it started well. 55:27 So yeah, for us, it, we wouldn't tolerate losing money. Yeah. But we'd happily, happily break even. Mm. The fact that it makes money is a bonus. So I've heard you talk about placing bets and wanting to do that. 55:37 That's worked. What's the worst bet you've made in the business? We bought a bunch of businesses- Mm... from, so talk about that. We talk, sort of talk about the experiences business. 55:46 We thought the way to succeed in what is a shitty business was get scale. Right. Our problem was lack of scale. Mm-hmm. Yeah. That was one of our problems. Yeah. The other problem was it was just a shit business. Yeah. 55:54 And as Warren Buffett says, like, "You're better off buying a good business for a fair price than a bad business for a low, a cheap price." Yeah. Yeah. It was more Charlie Munger actually, but- Yeah, yeah... 56:01 anyway, Buffett adopted it later. Uh, so we bought too many bad businesses for cheap prices. We bought a couple of okay ones. Mm. Uh, but we- And what, did they just become a distraction then? 56:10 You've got to try and integrate them. You've got to- Distraction, extra cap- We bought one called Brand... The biggest mistake was brand's exclusive. Right. Still mates with the guy, the founders, so they... 56:16 We didn't buy from them. We bought it from the radio station AP- APN, the newspaper- Oh, yeah... radio business. Yeah. Okay. 56:21 And they set up, and Kieran's on our board for a long, well, Kieran's guy sat on our board for a long time. So Jeff Hard was on our board. Mm. Then ran Channel Seven. 56:27 And I think Michael Miller may have been on our board briefly. Oh, maybe. Or maybe if he wasn't- Mm... one of his guys was. But, um, that was just, that probably cost us 100 million bucks. 56:36 So we paid, we gave script to APN, which was became really valuable. [laughs] Right. Yeah. And then we had this huge running cost, then we basically gave it to Catch for free at the end of the day. Oh, right. Yeah, okay. 56:43 And it was a huge distraction. And then- Yeah... we tried to build a single monolith back end that had product and travel and had to try to roll out ERP, and it was just a disaster. Mm. 56:51 And then as soon as we got rid of that, it was just like- Yeah... I guess it cost us a heap of money and it, but it was such a dumb... Like, even at the time we knew it was dumb. S- I don't know why we did it. 57:00 [laughs] Yeah. Yeah, okay. It was, it was so stupid. But that was- Yeah. You know, certainly in terms of dollars- Yeah... and opportunity cost, that was easily the worst mistake. Yeah. Yeah, yeah. 57:08 So, um, before we wrap up Contrarians, the podcast, so why'd you do that? And, uh, it's obviously taking off as a business in its own right now. It's- Yeah. Well, since Will came aboard, it's been great. Yeah. 57:18 Um, we, probably a bit like you guys. Mm. I really like it. Yeah. So I had a previous podcast with Nick Crockham from Blackbird. Um, so he- I do wish Nick... started a podcast. [laughs] Podcast. 57:26 And kicked on me, and it was actually, and Nick's pretty good with this stuff, and I said, "Yeah, well." Yeah. I, I did it. Um, and it was where I interviewed founders. Yeah. Um- Mm. 57:35 So, uh, uh, Graham Turner and- Yeah... Bassat, and all these amazing founders came on, and had like 35, 40 episodes. And Adea came on, and then I want to get you guys on actually. 57:45 [laughs] But anyway, um, had all these great, great founders on, and it was just a lot of work. Yes. 'Cause you got to like- Yeah... do all the work. I don't know, but it was just me. Yeah. It was during COVID. Yeah. 57:53 And so I'd write the questions, which takes like two to three hours, as, as Will pro- Will probably did- Yeah. [laughs]... over the last week. 57:59 And then you do the interview, then have to work on the edit, and then- Yeah... you do all the voiceovers. I was doing it with at least another big sort of podcast. Right. Mm. On top of the cost podcasting. 58:06 But it was just a lot of work. It wasn't... And I, I don't think, 'cause everyone does these things. Mm. And what, I didn't have any great competitive advantage. Mm. Mm. Um, I had a few listeners, but not massive number. 58:16 Mm. And then my listeners said, "Not commercial enough for us." I said, "I can't, I don't want your interference." So, you know- Yeah... we went our separate ways. But- Yeah... 58:22 just before we, we, that happened, I actually did a couple episodes with Adea where we just chatted about like all in business stuff. Yeah. All in style business stuff. And we just had this great rapport. 58:30 We, I knew him, but we didn't know each other super well. Yeah. And then, uh, probably six months later, I said to him, "Why don't we do our own show? Like, I'll find a producer." Yeah. "Let's do it." Mm. 58:38 And it takes him a while to get engaged and stuff, but when he does, he get, he really locks in. Yeah. After six months of sort of prodding, he finally agreed to it. 58:45 And you can sort of tell, and Jez, my, my, my co-founder is... There's my wife, my two harshest, but also most relevant critics. Yeah. If they hate something, it's usually right. 58:54 If they love something, it's usually right. And Jez said, like after the first episode, "I ha- I hate to say this, but it's amazing." Or words to that effect. Yeah. And that was- Yeah... and my wife always listens. 59:01 The fact that those two, who are most brutally honest with me- Mm. Mm... uh, gave me real confidence that- Mm... we think we got product market fit. Yeah. 59:08 And the early listeners, I mean, who still listen to this day, who are really smart people- Yeah... and people I really respect, loved it. And I thought, "This, this feels like a great product." Yes. Yeah. 59:16 Uh, Adea's a, like, generational talent. Um, and we had this great chemistry, like you guys had this great chemistry. Yeah. I was just about to say, there's a great chemistry between the two of you. Yeah. 59:24 And it just works. Yeah. And every... Like the 10,000 hour thing, you get better and better. Yeah. Yeah, true. 59:27 And part of the reason I do it, it takes, yeah, it takes two hours out of my, three hours out of my week, but I think it makes me a much better CEO. I, I can get advice- Mm... from an incredible chairman- Yeah... 59:35 in Adea. Yeah. And he's not my chairman, he's the chairman of a public- Yeah... listed company. And also, like, C- a big part of being a CEO is storytelling. Yes. I'm storytelling every- Yeah... every episode. 59:43 Every time, yeah... and I'm thinking on the spot and I'm reacting to him, and he's throwing questions. It's a great point, yeah. And so now I can speak to investors and, like, it's- Yeah... 59:50 like, nothing compared to that what I get on a podcast. You're also looking at businesses all the time, right? And you're, you're unpacking what works in different businesses. 59:56 And- Looking competitive ad- The way I think about competitive advantage has changed completely in the three years of doing the podcast. Yeah. Yeah. 1:00:01 Partly because Adea is probably one of the best strategic minds- Yeah... in the country. So- Did you think about Seven Powers before that, or was that more recent? He told me about it. Yeah. Mm. 1:00:08 Uh, he told me about it probably 30, 40 episodes in. Right. And then I started listening to Acquired, and I've listened to every single episode of Acquired, some multiple times. Yeah, Acquired's good. Yeah. 1:00:16 It's a great podcast. It's like the Costco Qui- Acquired episode is, it, that changed our business- Yeah... and probably added hundreds of millions of dollars to our valuation. 1:00:22 Like, it's that, that listening to that- Yeah... one episode and thinking about competitive advantage and- Yeah, they're great how deep they go and, yeah. Yeah. And it's just, and we had, um, Ben on our show. 1:00:29 He came on, he was super generous. And just being able to speak about competitive advantage and Hamilton Helmer- Yeah... and that brought to him, um- Amazing... was, was great. 1:00:37 So yeah, we, and ultimately, if we didn't love doing it, we wouldn't do it. Like you guys love doing this- Mm. Yeah... and you do it. Um, we don't... 1:00:43 Yeah, this business is actually making pretty decent money now, but we don't do it for the, for the money. No. We do it because we love it. 1:00:47 I love that you've started doing the kind of emergency pods when something happens. I love that timeliness. Yeah. 1:00:53 'Cause when, like, when Canva did the layoffs last week, you want to think, you want to hear smart people think about it or talk about it. The fact that you do it, like, that day- Yeah. 1:01:01 It's, it's so- It's, it's really fun because it's, it's like it's a breaking story. Yeah. 1:01:04 It feels like you're, you're not CNN, but, like, you're kind of talking about stuff, and you're probably gonna get some stuff wrong because it's so new. Yeah. Yeah. 1:01:10 But like we did one on, we did an episode on the Anthropic IPO. Yeah. And then, so it was part of an episode, and then like the next day at, the S1 dropped. I thought, "Oh." Yeah. 1:01:18 [laughs] "We have to do an emergency podcast." Another one. Because like it was, it was out of date. Ruined. Doing it again. Yeah. But like the, the, as well, the pod was much better pod because we had better info. Yeah. 1:01:25 Yeah. But it means you have to do extra work. But yeah, like it's, um, like- I'm so lucky. Like, you talk about luck and how important- Mm... luck is in life- Mm-hmm... 1:01:33 and we're obviously, we've all been really lucky in- Yeah, for sure... quite a few things. But- Yeah... and you sort of have to be. But like, to be, to have met Jess, to have met my wife, to have met Adir. 1:01:42 When Adir- Mm... ah, like as, like again, so everybody quotes Buffett, I overquote Buffett, but you wanna be able to like dance to work every day. Yeah. Yeah. And that makes it like... And I want my, I love my employees. 1:01:52 I don't know if they do, but I love them too. Mm. And I'm so lucky that I can come, I, I couldn't wait to come in to do the podcast with you guys. I love doing our podcast. Yeah. 1:02:00 Um, and I love coming to work and seeing people I work with, so like- I love that... couldn't be more lucky. I remember after selling Clagger and we'd 1:02:08 gone on a trip, and I kind of was wondering what I'm gonna do with the rest of my life, and like, am I gonna work again? Am I not? And I s- went to this Vincent Van Gogh exhibition, and there was this quote on the wall. 1:02:17 It's very cliched, I know, but it said, um, it was a quote from him that said, "One has to work and dare if one truly wants to live." And that was a mo- I'm like, "I'm gonna start another business." [laughs] Yeah. 1:02:27 'Cause I think, yeah, it's you've gotta dare, you've gotta like, you've gotta- Well, you have to do something. I mean, this is the thing, even after selling A2X, it's similar. Yeah. Just you gotta do what you... 1:02:35 If you enjoy your work, and you can dance to work, using the Buffett example, um- [laughs] Yeah... then, yeah, life's a lot better than doing something you hate, um, or doing nothing, or even playing golf. 1:02:44 At least, or doing nothing. Having no income. [laughs] Not a good enough golfer to play golf every day. 1:02:48 Every, every guest, we ask them, you know, that, I guess in the spirit of scrapes and scars and all the hard things building business, what, what's the, what was your worst day in the office? Actually, 1:02:58 I, I've always been able to take joy out of like bad thi- like menial things. Yeah. So like making furniture, like when I, for our original business. Yeah. Like it's kind of my... 1:03:05 I can remember there was a couple of hard days in the early days when you're literally putting together two apartments in a day. Yeah. 1:03:10 But [laughs] there's a bit of recency bias in this 'cause I'm going back four days, but I was flying back from New York last week, and like wifi on planes is super important to me. I'm always working. Yeah, yeah. 1:03:19 And Microsoft going down for, while I was on the plane for 12 hours- Yeah... probably is bad. I, we, we, we obviously had WhatsApp still, so, but ALT was joking. Well, and then the US, the airlines got hit. I got out. 1:03:29 Like, I literally just missed that US downfall. Oh. Yeah. But I came back from the US last week. 1:03:32 I was a few days ahead of it, but you think if you're traveling and you lose your [laughs] email, and then two days later- You can't fly... you're some American stuck in, I don't know, wherever. Yeah. And you can't fly. 1:03:41 So I was super lucky to get out, but like that was a tough day, not having email for a whole, whole day. Like, there was stuff I had to do, and I couldn't do it. So like- Yeah... 1:03:47 but that's like, I'm pretty lucky that I don't really- I found it quite liberating to be honest. [laughs] [laughs] It was just a day where I could actually go through the backlog. 1:03:55 It's probably worse 'cause I was on a plane with nothing to do. Yeah. And like, I like, I, I always like trying to work 100% of the time on a plane. I do work almost every- Yeah, same here. 1:04:03 Uh, and I couldn't, and it was like, it was bad. [laughs] Yeah. Well, like my, I take the view that if I'm traveling, I might as well max out on my work- This is it... so when I'm home- Yeah. Yeah, exactly... 1:04:11 I can spend more time with the family. I think a lot of our team are unhappy that we're on Google and they didn't have an excuse. [laughs] [laughs] A lot of people were saying, "Should be, should be on Google-" Yeah... 1:04:18 "tech guys." But that's usually- Should be on Google... when I'm going on Outlook. Yeah. [laughs] But, um, and it like... Well, I actually w- I slept a bit on the plane. 1:04:23 When I woke up, it was back, so I got a bit- You got it... of an interview, but it was, yeah, it was probably like eight or nine hours where- Yeah... it wasn't. So that was a- Yeah... it was a tough eight or nine hours. 1:04:31 It's a reason I don't generally fly Qantas internationally, because you can't work. Well, I was on Delta, so internet was actually- Yeah... it wasn't Starlink. It was pretty good. 1:04:37 Qantas now has a, they've been, you know, on some of them. Almost rolled out. On some of them, yeah. Like so what, half now or is it, is it pretty much- I find my nice flights to the US have it. 1:04:45 I think it's about 75% now. Oh, okay. I, I- But the 330 Singapore don't have it, but the, the US ones do Yeah, okay. Um. Okay. That's good. It's almost there. 'Cause it's a great airline. I just want internet. 1:04:52 [laughs] I think Qantas is unfail-... Like, we obviously work with all the airlines, but Qantas is unfailing a lot in many ways. Yeah. It's actually a pretty good product. Yeah. I think it, it's better now. 1:05:00 I feel like a few years, like maybe five ago- The joshies were tough... it was not so good. [laughs] The joshies were tough, yeah. 1:05:04 [laughs] The last, the first joshies were great, and obviously it's, it's, there's a whole podcast in itself. But, um- Yeah, I was gonna say, we could probably do a whole podcast just complaining about airlines. 1:05:11 [laughs] Yeah. But I, I, we're actually pretty lucky in Australia. We've got two amazing airlines. Yeah, yeah. Obviously I'm biased because we work with both of them, but no, no, we're pretty lucky. Yeah. Great. Awesome. 1:05:19 Well, thanks Adam. Been awesome- Thanks for having us... to have you on the podcast. Hope to come on. 1:05:21 And, uh, yeah, love telling the stories of founders building businesses and going through all the, the hard yards of, you know- Yeah... doing things wrong, making mistakes, and how we learn from all that. 1:05:30 So yeah, been great to hear the story. What a story. From backpackers to luxury travel. [laughs] That's an amazing- Makes for one interview, hey?... amazing Australian story. I'm super pumped to be on. 1:05:39 You guys are legends of the tech scene, so it's, uh, super big thrill to be here. Thanks, mate. Cheers. Great chat. Thanks. 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